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I am by no means blind to the failings of the legal profession .... I know that we 
are often too conservative. We don't realize that the world is changing. We don't 
sufficiently look ahead. Instead of trying to help in so shaping changes that they 
accomplish benefits with a minimum of disturbance, we often stand stubbornly for 
the maintenance of methods that have been outworn.' 
INTRODUCTION 
What does the American legal profession's history of crisis manage-
ment tell us about the future of lawyer regulation? Can lawyers effectively 
regulate lawyers in a forward-looking, manage-for-the-future way? Should 
lawyers explicitly share regulation of the legal profession with non-lawyers? 
I. Henry P. Chandler, What the Bar Does Today, 7 AM. LAW ScH. REv. 1017, 1022 
(1930-34). 
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The American legal profession has engaged in a largely crisis-
management form of regulation, and it has done so poorly, narrow-
mindedly, and myopically. The 1908 Canons were in large part the result of 
the elite branch of the profession's fear of the profession's changing de-
mographics and the influence of the incoming eastern and southern Europe-
an immigrants. The Kutak Commission and the resulting Model Rules were 
one of the profession's responses to the Watergate crisis. An embarrassed 
legal profession acted in response to the diminished public opinion of law-
yers generated by their prominent place in the scandals. Now, Ethics 2020 is 
in some measure the result of Enron and related events that produced an 
outcry against lawyers, accountants and businesspeople, as well as the eco-
nomic crisis of the 2000s. Regulatory-reform decisions made in these crisis 
management modes have been largely lawyer-protectionist, and specifically 
status quo protectionist. The American legal profession has managed crisis 
mainly by drawing in, staffing the ramparts, and protecting against the in-
fluence of the world outside the profession, while making only enough 
change to appease the public or the government and allow the current crisis 
to pass. It tends to exclude or reduce to a minimum the views of those out-
side the profession, characterizing outsiders as ill-informed and lacking in 
understanding of the true nature of the legal profession. At every tum, the 
reforms and changes made have had little or no effect on the lives of the 
elite lawyers who created the changes. The profession is reacting to the cur-
rent economic crisis in the same narrow fashion, and it will produce the 
same predictably backward-looking results. The American legal profession 
has managed crisis mainly by drawing in, staffing the ramparts, and protect-
ing against the influence of the world outside the profession, while making 
only enough change to appease the public or the government and allow the 
current crisis to pass. At every tum, the reforms and changes made have had 
little or no effect on the lives of the elite lawyers who created the changes. 
Future regulation should no longer be inward-looking reactions to crisis, but 
instead forward-looking and innovative for those who are members of the 
legal profession. Only when the legal profession welcomes the influence, 
views, and expertise of the world outside its membership will effective, 
forward-looking regulation of the legal profession be possible. 
Views from outside of the profession are essential in making large-
scale decisions about how the legal profession should be formed and man-
aged. Management of an enterprise as important, massive, and influential as 
the legal profession should be neither protectionist nor inbred. Lawyers and 
exclusively-membered lawyer organizations are handicapped as managers 
by their narrow range. I suggest that greater advances and more effective 
regulation could occur by looking outward to find in society and culture the 
causes of and connections with the legal profession's crises. Doing so 
would allow the profession to grow with the society, solve problems with 
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rather than against the flow of society, and be more attuned to the society 
the profession claims to serve. 
I. CRISIS 
What do I mean by "crisis" in the legal profession? I claim the profes-
sion engages in "regulation-by-crisis." So what do I mean by that phrase? 
In some ways, the American legal profession is always in crisis. By 
their very nature, American lawyers and courts find themselves at the center 
both of social movements and of more transient controversies alike. Being a 
part of such events produces a feeling of crisis, or of unsettledness. That 
day-to-day placement of the legal profession in controversy's path then cre-
ates a perpetual sensation of crisis. But that perpetual sense of crisis is not 
what I mean by "crisis" in the phrase "regulation-by-crisis." Instead, by 
"crisis," I mean periods in the history of the American legal profession 
when it might fairly be said that the crisis sense was different, more pro-
nounced, to be sure, but even different-in-kind from the usual. Outside these 
special times, the profession is confident in the midst of its daily regime of 
controversy, sees its place rightly there, and sees that the profession is a 
steadying influence amid crisis and controversy. Unlike the day-to-day 
sense of crisis, during these special crisis times that are the subject of this 
Article, the profession itself sees the crisis, feels and reacts to the crisis, and 
even fears it. During these times, the profession is unsure of itself and less 
confident about its future and its place. The phrase "regulation-by-crisis" is 
about some of those special times and about the profession's response. Does 
the profession see itself and its difficulties during such times as part the 
larger society's problems and attributes? Does the profession respond to its 
crises by looking inward or outward? 
My thesis is that the profession too often looks inward to diagnose and 
solve its crises. Doing so has caused the profession to be a late-arriving 
member of the society during times of change. Doing so has caused the pro-
fession too often to fail in what could have been a leadership role in the 
society. Rather, the profession has too often been seen as a last bastion of a 
prior time, clinging too tightly to its past and failing to grow in step with 
world developments. This is not to say that the profession should dismiss its 
core attributes at the first signs of societal change; it is to say that a percep-
tive growing with change would be preferable to consistent, persistent re-
sistance to change. We credit the greatest lawyers with being able to antici-
pate and predict the course of law's change and the readiness of society for 
change. But as an institution, the legal profession has been a poor lawyer by 
this measure, most often staying blind to change that is happening all 
around it. The legal profession has engaged in regulatory reform in response 
to crisis, and when doing so, has tended to resist partnership with the society 
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when it should seek to lead. Such a regulatory management style is doomed 
to be backward-looking and behind the times. 
I will use the following three historical examples: ( 1) immigration in 
the twentieth century, (2) Watergate, and (3) multijurisdictional practice and 
globalization, to illustrate my thesis that the profession reacts to crises by 
making as few changes to the status quo as possible, and when change is 
made, to avoid change that affects current members of the profession.2 
A. Example 1: Immigration in the Early Twentieth Century 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the legal profession regarded it-
self as being in a crisis brought on by a changing membership. The charac-
ter of the bar was changing. It had already changed from a largely rural bar 
with the "country lawyer" as the prototype to a more urban bar with the 
corporate lawyer as the prototype. But now the urban segment of the bar 
was developing into a two-strata bar with corporate lawyers as the elite, and 
urban, ethnic lawyers as an underclass. 3 
This development was viewed askance for at least two reasons. First, 
the character of the bar as an elite, white male Protestant-dominated profes-
sion was threatened if not by the influence of the new lawyer-underclass, 
then by the underclass's growing numbers.4 The smirch on the purity of the 
bar by an influx of Jewish and Catholic lawyers was being felt by the pro-
fessional elite. Second, the work being done by this new lawyer underclass 
directly harmed the interests of the elite's clientele. The underclass repre-
sented workers and to some extent consumers of products with claims 
against their employers and the corporate producers of products. Many of 
these claims were contingent fee claims. Further, many of the relationships 
between the underc1ass of lawyers and their clients were being forged 
through the lawyers' advertising and solicitation practices. Practices that 
had once been thought to be poor form, but not unethical or unlawful, were 
now actually having a deleterious effect on the bar elite and their clients. 
Previous experiences with lawyer advertising had been little more than mild 
annoyance. Nineteenth-century country lawyers had advertised; even found-
ing father lawyers had placed newspaper notices addressed to prospective 
clients. 5 But now the practice of advertising mattered. Claims that would not 
2. More on these three and other such crisis periods in the legal profession will be 
included in my forthcoming book, JAMES E. MOLITERNO, A PROFESSION IN CRISIS (Oxford 
University Press 2013) (under contract). 
3. James Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seismography, 32 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 781, 810(1997). 
4. ld. at 810-14. 
5. I ANTON-HERMONN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 
41 n.109 (1965); see also ERWIN C. SURRENCY, THE LAWYER AND THE REVOLUTION (1964), 
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otherwise be brought were being brought. And those claims were being 
brought against the elite lawyers' clients. 
The profession was effectively in the control of the elite lawyers at the 
time, as newly formed bar associations asserted their claims to speak for the 
profession, and bar discipline committees made decisions about the applica-
tion of new lawyer ethics codes. What did the profession do in response to 
this influx of urban, ethnic lawyers and the claims being filed by their for-
merly unrepresented clients? Through a variety of methods, the profession 
sought to exclude the new lawyers from the profession, it sought to mini-
mize the new lawyers' ability to communicate with prospective clients, and 
it sought to limit the ability of the new lawyers to undertake matters on con-
tingent fees, the only fee arrangement possible for many of their clients.6 By 
proposing and adopting these changes, the bar elite sought to maintain the 
status quo while the rest of society and culture changed: corporate lawyer, 
white male, Protestant domination of the profession and few worker claims 
while the population diversified and industrialization altered corporate-
worker relationships and interdependence. 
At its foundation, the organized bar wielded its own newly-forged 
weapons against the politically undesirable new segment of the bar. Indeed, 
beyond being a mere social club, arguably the very purpose of the organized 
bar's foundation was the preservation of a white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
(WASP) elite and the elimination or marginalization of the newer southern 
and eastern European lawyers who were increasingly populating American 
industrial centers.7 The early bar had many goals, but all stemmed from the 
same motive: the desire to exclude undesirable groups from the practice of 
the law, and reduce the ability of those already licensed to reach and serve 
their clientele. Ostensibly, of course, the bar had nobler goals in mind; it 
sought to restore the legal profession to the height of respect that it had en-
joyed in Abraham Lincoln's time. At the root, however, the aim was to ex-
clude the poor and immigrant lawyers who, with the help of part-time law 
schools in large urban centers, were entering the profession at an increasing 
rate. 
1. The Birth of Bar Associations 
After the Civil War had come to a close, the American bar was com-
posed of a basically homogenous group: overwhelmingly white, Anglo-
Saxon, and Protestant men. The prototype of the "country lawyer" dominat-
reprinted in READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 74 (Dennis R. 
Nolan ed., 1980). 
6. Molitemo, supra note 3, at 810-14. 
7. /d. 
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ed the American legal profession.8 Even as America industrialized and the 
country lawyer therefore became more and more an anachronism, "images 
remained vivid of that child of the American frontier, self-taught in a Ken-
tucky log cabin, the circuit-riding country lawyer in Illinois who became 
President to save the Union and died to make men free."9 This image ex-
pressed everything that the American lawyer desired to be: both aristocrat 
and democrat, uniting the higher class and the lower to achieve the perfect 
democracy. This was the "Golden Age" of the American bar, the age for 
which many lawyers would continually pine for more than a century to 
come. 
However, as industrialization increased, immigration increased with it, 
and the composition of the American bar began to reflect that of the country 
as a whole. Lawyers became alarmed that "[t]he proportion of white Anglo-
Saxon Protestants within the legal profession and American society was 
diminishing as changing immigration and demographic patterns swelled 
cities and the profession with the foreign-born and their children." 10 The 
aristocratic and democratic country lawyer had arisen out of a mostly ho-
mogenous society; but by 1900, that homogenous national and professional 
culture no longer existed. Many lawyers saw a need to act to save this para-
digm of the country lawyer, which no longer fit an industrialized and urban-
ized society; they saw these largely industrial and urban immigrants as a 
threat to that paradigm. 11 Their response was to organize themselves into bar 
associations, from which the lawyers of this new underclass could be denied 
admission and thus prestige in their profession. Bar associations were, in the 
first instance, simply a way of separating the elite from the recent immi-
grants who were so distressing the WASP establishment. The first bar asso-
ciations were voluntary, invitation-only organizations and did not encom-
pass anywhere near the entire range of a given geographic area's bar. They 
resembled clubs more than today's more professional, more inclusive trade 
organizations. During this period, lawyers created voluntary associations "to 
insulate themselves from the rougher, unethical parts of the bar."12 The 
composition of those "rougher, unethical parts" can be deduced from the 
location of the first bar association, New York City, the arrival point of the 
8. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
MODERN AMERICA 15 (1976). 
9. /d. 
10. /d. at 5. 
11. /d. 
12. Walter W. Steele, Jr., Cleaning up the Legal Profession: The Power to Disci-
pline-The Judiciary and the Legislature, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 413,420 (1978). 
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great part of the immigrants who began flooding into the country, the so-
called "dumping ground of the world." 13 
The fact that the organized bar saw the new immigrants as undesira-
bles who must be excluded is evident in the literature of the period. No less 
a figure than Roscoe Pound, dean of the Harvard Law School, referred to 
such people by implication as "the defective, the degenerate of decadent 
stocks, and the ignorant or enfeebled victim of severe economic pressure ... 
• "
14 In fairness, Pound was attempting to solve the legal problems that the 
presence of such "defectives" posed in his day; his work was not one of 
racist or anti-Semitic polemic. However, the fact that Pound was willing to 
refer to such people in this way, even if he was discussing ways of fulfilling 
their legal necessities, betrays the general attitude of the early twentieth 
century bar. 
The purpose generally claimed for the organized bar, "to raise the 
standards of the profession and speak as a unified voice for the interests of 
attorneys as a class,"15 was undoubtedly genuine. Lawyers truly bemoaned 
the decline in the reputation of the profession that accompanied its adher-
ence to the corporate elites in America. However, the corporation lawyers 
who had become dominant still considered themselves to be the heirs of the 
country lawyer tradition and of all that was best in American legal life. The 
corporation lawyers did share common ethnic origins with the country law-
yer as well as the men of industry whom they now served. There must, 
therefore, be some other cause for the destruction of the esteem in which 
Americans once held the legal profession, since corporate lawyers were, in 
their own eyes, the same as the country lawyers that Americans once loved. 
That cause was the pollution of the bar by immigrants, who had no idea of 
ethical behavior, spoke broken English, 16 and belonged to strange religions 
that were either traditionally held in reprobation by English-descended 
Americans17 or were so alien that they denied Christianity altogetherY 
13. !d.; Edward S. Thurston, Proceedings of the Section of Legal Education, 34 
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 632, 646 (1911) (Statement ofF. M. Danaher) [hereinafter Proceedings of 
the SLE, 191l]. 
14. Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV. L. 
REV. 302,311 (1913). 
15. Teny Radtke, The Last Stage in Reprofessionalizing the Bar: The Wisconsin Bar 
Integration Movement, 1934-1956,81 MARQ. L. REv. 1001, 1002-03 (1998). 
16. See AUERBACH, supra note 8, at 49 (quoting Isidore J. Kresel, Ambulance Chas-
ing, Its Evils and Remedies Therefor, in 52 N.Y. ST. BAR Ass'N, PROCEEDINGS AND 
COMMITIEE REPORTS, 337-39 (1929)) (citing an investigation in which the fact that attorneys 
"could not speak the King's English correctly" was considered proof of their unfitness to 
practice law). 
17. Catholicism, of course, had been illegal in England, with short reliefs, since the 
fifteenth century, was only made legal in the nineteenth, and the prejudice that Protestant 
Englishmen had toward it was often carried over to America. See, e.g., JOHN HIGHAM, 
STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PA TIERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925, 5-7 (1988). 
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"Raising the standards of the profession," then, meant eliminating unethical 
conduct, and unethical conduct was whatever was not in accord with the 
country lawyer tradition that Americans had once so revered. Codes of eth-
ics were therefore adopted to express this past legal tradition so perfectly 
that they immediately became an anachronism in their own time, a time 
dominated not by the country lawyer but by the urban, corporation lawyer. 
2. The Code of Ethics 
The code of ethics that this bar erected was designed to affect princi-
pally the immigrant lawyers. These lawyers were primarily urban solo prac-
titioners, and their professional practices were about to be declared unethi-
cal because the established lawyers said they were. It is amply clear that the 
impetus behind the 1908 Canons was in large measure a subterfuge for class 
and ethnic hostility. The code was a subterfuge because it was not openly 
nativist. However, the reasons cited for requiring the code of ethics specifi-
cally target the practices of lower-class lawyers, who were in large part 
from poor and foreign backgrounds. Furthermore, the Committee's report 
has an overtly nativist tone despite its lack of specific derogation. 19 Histori-
ans and lawyers alike have found that "[t]he ethical crusade that produced 
the Canons concealed class and ethnic hostility,"20 and the content of "un-
ethical" behavior therefore became the behavior of the disfavored ethnici-
ties, regardless of its actual character. As one ethics scholar commented, the 
Canons "were motivated in major part by the large numbers of Catholic 
immigrants from Italy and Ireland and Jews from Eastern Europe beginning 
in about 1880,"21 and "[ d]eviance was less an attribute of an act than a 
judgment by one group of lawyers about the inferiority of another."22 
Two pillars of this code were most prominent in their attack on lower-
class lawyers; both of them, however, can be united under the single de-
18. While wealthy Jews generally enjoyed success in the American legal communi-
ty, as lawyers such as Felix Frankfurter bear witness, Jews of eastern or southern European 
background, who tended to be poor and without prominent connections, were discriminated 
against much as were all immigrants from that region. See AUERBACH, supra note 8, at 185 
(stating that "[a] few German Jews from an earlier generation-Brandeis, Louis Marshall, 
Julian Mack, Samuel Untermeyer-had securely established themselves"); id. at 186-87 
(showing that even so, Jews often had a more difficult time securing employment than An-
glo-Saxon Protestants); id. at 52 (citing southern and eastern European background as a 
factor in rendering a candidate's Jewishness too pervasive to be overlooked). 
19. See A.B.A. Comm. on Code ofProfl Ethics, Report ofthe Committee on Code 
of Professional Ethics, 29 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 600, 601 (1906) [hereinafter Report on Profes-
sional Ethics]. 
20. AUERBACH, supra note 8, at 50. 
21. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 3 (1990). 
22. AUERBACH, supra note 8, at 50. 
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rogatory appellation of "commercialization of the profession," or, more 
specifically, "ambulance chasing." 
a. Advertisement 
One of the most prominent objections to immigrant lawyers' practices 
was that they tended to advertise. The corporation lawyers who had become 
the elite in late nineteenth and early twentieth century America did not ad-
vertise; they had no need to do so. Elite lawyers already had enough con-
nections to supply them with new clients, or they were retained by business-
es as counsel and therefore had no need of new clients, particularly from the 
lower classes who had little or nothing with which to pay them. The fact 
that the new lawyers, on the other hand, did advertise and aggressively 
sought new clients, particularly for tort cases taken on a contingent fee, 
made advertising ipso facto unethicat.23 
Here again the ideals of the country lawyer, as realized in the industri-
al revolution's big business firm, obfuscated the [then] current situation of 
the profession. The country lawyer and the corporation lawyer were both 
well-known in the community; they could rely on clients coming to them. In 
the lower-strata urban situation, however, relationships between lawyers 
and clients were entirely different. Lawyers were not well-known in the 
community simply by virtue of their profession; they were required to ad-
vertise in order to acquire clients, both for justice's sake and for their own 
economic necessity. The code of ethics prohibited nearly all advertising, a 
prohibition that would affect only the practices of the urban and largely 
immigrant underclass. Opposition to the "commercialization" of lawyers, 
the bugaboo that the established corporate society presented as the reason 
for their new prohibition on advertising, was the innocent front that shel-
tered the antagonism toward lawyers from ethnic minority groups who rep-
resented the formerly unrepresented in making claims against the elite law-
yers' clients. Like the Anatole France quote about laws prohibiting sleeping 
23. More or less all advertising was prohibited under the Canons. All "solicitation of 
business by circulars or advertisements" was deemed unprofessional; it was "equally unpro-
fessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind." Even "[i]ndirect 
advertisement . . . by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning causes in 
which the lawyer has been or is engaged, or concerning the manner of their conduct" was 
prohibited. Effectively all advertising was, then, forbidden, except, of course, for business 
cards. Those were used by the professional elite, and therefore could not possibly be unethi-
cal. ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, Canon 27 (1908), reprinted in ABA COMM. ON PROF'L 
ETHICS & GRIEVANCES, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND 
GRIEVANCES: WITH THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, ANNOTATED, AND THE CANONS OF 
JUDICIAL ETHICS, ANNOTATED 19 (1957) [hereinafter ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS]. 
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under bridges, the advertising rules applied to lawyers for the rich and poor 
alike.24 
Interestingly enough, this prohibition on advertising was new. Despite 
the fact that it is perfectly suited to the country lawyer ethos, those country 
lawyers themselves never saw a need to implement such a prohibition and 
freely engaged in the limited advertising that the technology of their time 
allowed. One of the ethical treatises on which the new code of ethics was 
based, Sharswood's in 1853, put no restrictions on advertising, and many 
ethical systems, including those of most of the states, permitted certain 
amounts of newspaper advertising, at least.25 The new 1908 ABA Canons of 
Ethics, however, prohibited nearly all advertising; even business cards re-
ceived only reluctant approvat.26 This sudden discovery of a legal norm 
against lawyer advertising, entirely baseless in the traditions of the profes-
sion, reinforces the conclusion that the corporate legal community imposed 
the rule as an ethnic and economic weapon, rather than as an attempt to re-
store the image of the profession in the public eye. To the extent it was a 
genuine effort to restore the public image of lawyers, it was an expression 
that the practices of the new underclass lawyers were the cause of any di-
minished public image of lawyers. 
Included in the prohibition on advertising was any direct seeking of 
clients, including simply approaching them, telling them that they probably 
had a legal claim, and offering to represent them.27 These acts of solicitation 
were considered the height of commercialism and formed the substance of 
what was derisively called "ambulance chasing." To be sure, those lawyers 
engaged in these practices did so because the practices were an economic 
necessity to their livelihood. But they also doubtlessly considered them-
selves to be performing a needed service by informing those who might be 
ignorant of their claims of the legal recourse available to them. The ABA 
considered such education to be decidedly unethical. The hypocrisy of the 
elite in this matter is ironic, as one commentator noted, saying that "my 
experience has been that it is the corporation agents who are the ones who 
rush to the hospital, or bedside of the dying, and try to get their releases 
from them." 28 Indeed, as late as 1955 one prominent bar leader and com-
mentator stated that "[ o ]f all the forms of unethical conduct possible, it is 
24. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE REo LILY 75 (The Modern Library 1917) (It is "the 
majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to 
beg in the streets, and to steal their bread."). 
25. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1854); see HENRYS. 
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 213 (1953); Moliterno, supra note 3, at 791-92. 
26. ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, Canon 27. 
27. /d. Canon 28. 
28. Frank C. McGirr, Sanitation of the Bar: Exposure at Bar Association Meeting of 
the Latest Methods for Employing Courts for Vicious Purposes by Ambulance Chasers, 4 J. 
AM. JUDICATURE Soc'v, June 1920, at 5, 6. 
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doubtful that any embody more elements tending to weaken the force of the 
legal profession and hinder the administration of justice than does ambu-
lance chasing. "29 The ABA leadership itself was hardly more subtle; indeed, 
it was ambulance chasing that inspired them to promulgate their code of 
ethics in the first place.30 The Canons vehemently declared that "[i]t is un-
professional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in 
rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do 
so,"31 which may be fairly translated as "except when corporate lawyers do 
it." The ABA also decided that employing others to seek out valid claims 
and recommend a lawyer's services was unethical.32 No justification was 
given for its proclamation. Scholars, too, continually decried the supposed 
evils of ambulance chasing. 
Not only ethnic but also monetary considerations played a role in the 
prohibition on advertising. Most of the framers of the code represented 
business interests; most lawyers who advertised were serving the poor, often 
representing them in tort cases that arose as a result of injuries received in 
working for businesses. Such claims would be far less likely to be brought if 
urban, ethnic, underclass lawyers could be restrained from advertising about 
their services, soliciting the business of injured persons, and offering con-
tingent fee arrangements to those unable to afford a pay-as-you-go lawyer 
fee, especially since most of those bringing the claims were ignorant of their 
claims' value until their lawyers' runners informed them of it. Since these 
advertising restrictions were virtually the only substantive changes from 
former state codes of ethics to the new ABA Canons, the inference is strong 
that the new restrictions masked ethnic and economic advantage-taking. The 
prohibition on advertising had no other purpose than the suppression not 
only of the largely immigrant lawyers who relied on it for their livelihoods, 
but also of the largely immigrant blue-collar workers who made use of those 
lawyers to litigate their claims against the business interests that the elite 
lawyers who so despised the underclass almost universally represented. 
b. The Contingent Fee 
A contingent fee is simply an agreement by which payment to the at-
torney is subject to some contingency, generally either favorable settlement 
or favorable result at trial, the creation of a res from which the lawyer's fee 
can be drawn. Since ancient times, however, agreements between a litigant 
and a stranger to the claim to share the proceeds have been condemned as 
29. Note, Legal Ethics: Ambulance Chasing, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 182, 186 (1955). 
30. A.B.A. Comm. on Code of Prof' I Ethics, Report of the Committee on Code of 
Professional Ethics, 31 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 676,682 (1907). 
31. ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, Canon 28. 
32. /d. 
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champerty. 33 In the case of a contingent fee, the attorney was considered a 
stranger to the lawsuit: that is, he was neither plaintiff nor defendant and he 
pursued the litigant's claim by paying for it (with his services) in exchange 
for part of the settlement. The rule made some degree of sense in the pre-
industrial society for which it was made; contingent fees were unnecessary, 
since the tort claims for which contingent fees primarily evolved were com-
paratively rare and litigants were more likely to be on a level playing field 
financially. Allowing contingent fees in such a situation would have been 
nothing more than giving attorneys and clients an incentive to file dubious 
claims for their nuisance value.34 It has been thought that the arrangement 
might even encourage perjury, since a lawyer, knowing that his fee rests 
upon his prevailing, may encourage his client or witnesses to stretch or in-
vent the truth to achieve a favorable result.35 The contingent fee offered little 
benefit and substantial cost. With the advent of industrialization, however, 
the balance of the benefits and costs of the prudential value of the contin-
gent fee radically changed. 
It was "the Industrial Revolution which brought into sharp contrast the 
group of lawyers who were willing to take cases on contingencies and those 
who were not."36 The division was, of course, that between the hoi polloi 
and the elite: 
The latter [those who would not take a case on contingency] represented the de-
fendant railroads, steamships, factories, power companies. They were the admitted 
leaders of the bar. The former [those who would take contingent fees] were the 
young lawyers struggling to make a living. They could scarcely help being an infe-
rior class. 37 
The organized bar's continued opposition to contingent fees made this 
division perfectly obvious. Contingent fees, often the only way a poor per-
son could afford any sort of legal service, were the heart of the immigrant 
lawyer's practice; without them, no one could afford his services, he could 
not afford to live, and his practice would necessarily fall to the wayside. 
33. James E. Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 223 (2002); Max Radin, Maintenance By Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48 (1935). 
34. See Max Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 587, 589 
(1940) ("The contingent fee certainly increases the possibility that vexatious and unfounded 
suits will be brought."). 
35. See, e.g., George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics, 32 ANN. REP. 
A.B.A. I, 160-64 (1907) (suggesting that an attorney on a contingent fee would be "tempted 
to make success, at all hazards and by all means, the sole end of his exertions."); see also 
Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of 
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 40 (1989) (that contingent fees are prohibited in criminal 
cases because of the risk of the attorney impeding justice, "presumably by suborning per-
jury"). 
36. Radin, supra note 34, at 588. 
37. /d. 
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Both the poor, injured worker and the immigrant lawyer needed the contin-
gent fee for their survival. 
The lawyer needed the contingent fee because he was not part of the 
new elite that could rely upon being retained by the great industrial corpora-
tions for his livelihood. The lower-class lawyer required a certain degree of 
client turnover in order to survive, and offering a contingent fee to those 
otherwise unable to pay for legal services was the only way to ensure that 
turnover. The poor worker needed contingent fees even more. Auerbach 
eloquently described the necessity of such fees for the poor: 
An alarming proliferation of work and transportation accidents, most often borne 
by those least able to afford lawyers' fees, generated human tragedies which a 
profit economy and its legal doctrines exacerbated. Accident victims-and the sur-
viving members of their families-were compelled to bear the full burden for the 
risks inherent in dangerous work. Corporate profit was the primary social value .. . 
. legal services were available only to those who could afford to purchase them ... . 
In more than half of all work-accident fatalities in Allegheny County [for exam-
ple], widows and children bore the entire income loss. In fewer than one-third of 
these cases did an employer pay as much as five hundred dollars-the equivalent 
of a single year's income for the lowest-paid workers. Similarly, more than half of 
all injured workers received no compensation; only 5 percent were fully compen-
sated for their lost working time while disabled?8 
Workers in such situations could hardly afford the out-of-pocket ex-
pense of retaining a lawyer at an hourly rate, particularly with the substan-
tial risk of losing, thus suffering not only the expenses of their injuries but 
also the equally unrequited expenses of an unsuccessful legal venture. The 
contingent fee, however, provided a way for such workers to pursue their 
claims without worsening their situation. The arrangement was and is a nec-
essary consequence of the desire to provide everyone with the capability of 
pursuing meritorious legal claims. 
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the new code 
of ethics was being formed and promulgated, the prudential value of the 
contingent fee was already outweighing the risks beyond any serious ques-
tion. In a rapidly growing and industrialized society, "[t]here were far too 
many persons who could pay no retainers and far too many lawyers who 
could not afford to insist on them."39 At a time in which workers had pre-
cious little assistance, "the contingent fee arrangement did enable some 
workers to secure otherwise unattainable legal services."40 The balance of 
the possibility of unmeritorious suits being brought and the certainty of the 
denial of any recourse for the wrongfully injured and others with legal 
claims can come down on only one side. Furthermore, one could argue 
whether the possibility of unmeritorious suits is a problem unique to, or 
38. AUERBACH, supra note 8, at 44. 
39. Radin, supra note 34, at 588. 
40. AUERBACH, supra note 8, at 45. 
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even especially associated with, the contingent fee agreement, since no one 
would deny "that vexatious and unfounded suits have been brought by men 
who could and did pay substantial attorneys' fees for that purpose."41 If any-
thing, the stake undertaken by a plaintiffs lawyer may reduce the likelihood 
of frivolous claims. The contingent fee lawyer is unlikely to contribute his 
services to what he regards as a claim unlikely of success. It was not the 
practice of defendants to pay significant sums to settle weak claims. The 
societal costs of the contingent fee, then, are substantially outweighed by its 
value. 
However, elite corporate lawyers bemoaned the existence of the con-
tingent fee as an attack upon legal professionalism. Nothing despaired the 
professional elite more than contingent fees and the negligence lawyers 
whose practice depended upon them. All manner of the profession's woes 
were laid at the feet of the contingent fee. The reduced status and declining 
spirit of the entire profession were the claimed fruits of the contingent fee. 
Furthermore, corporate clients were losing money on the suits that contin-
gent fees made possible, which gave the corporate legal elite no end of 
headache. One lawyer present during the debates over the lawfulness of the 
contingent fee wrote "that every lawyer that got up here today in favor of 
this bill [which restricted contingent fees] was a corporation lawyer. Why 
they are so opposed to contingent fees I do not know .... "42 Of course, he 
knew exactly why they were so opposed to contingent fees. 
No objection to the contingent fee was too ridiculous or contrary to 
common sense to be forwarded as dispositive. One objection, for example, 
was that the client's interests are likely to suffer from the lawyer's urge to 
make as much money as possible.43 Putting aside the assumption that a law-
yer on a contingent fee will be greedier than one on an hourly fee (a ques-
tionable assumption at best), the more likely conclusion is that a lawyer 
would be more zealous for his client's interests, because he is receiving part 
of the recovery. An hourly lawyer, on the other hand, receives his fee 
whether he wins or loses, and has significantly less monetary incentive to 
pursue his client's goals. Nevertheless, this objection was voiced often, as 
though questioning its obviously specious reasoning amounted to sympa-
thizing with greed itself. 
The disapproval of the contingent fee was pervasive among the elite. 
Therefore, when this same elite decided to draw up a code of ethics, it drew 
up a special canon intended to sharply limit the contingent fee. 
The Canons could not, of course, eliminate the contingent fee entirely 
because the laws of the United States considered the validity of such fees 
41. Radin, supra note 34, at 589. 
42. McGirr, supra note 28, at II. 
43. Legal Ethics: Ambulance Chasing, supra note 29, at 185. 
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"beyond legitimate controversy"44 as early as 1877. Indeed, even many early 
state codes of ethics, based largely upon the 1888 Alabama code,45 
acknowledged that the contingent fee was valid, including a statement that 
contingent fees may permissibly be higher than other fees because of the 
risk involved.46 The most that ethical theorists could say was that contingent 
fees were "somewhat inconsistent" with the prohibition on stirring up litiga-
tion.47 Contingent fees were therefore put under what was intended to be a 
severe stricture by the ABA: the Canons declared that contingent fee ar-
rangements "should be under the supervision of the Court in order that eli-
ents may be protected from unjust charges."48 This Canon betrayed so much 
the prejudices of its authors that each point of it bears individual considera-
tion. 
The rationale for so restricting contingent fees, "that clients may be 
protected from unjust charges,"49 is transparently specious. Presumably the 
writers of the Canon reasoned that contingent fees were often excessive. 
However, all fees were subject to the preceding Canon, which proposed no 
fewer than six factors for consideration in setting a neither exorbitant nor 
minimal fee. 50 One of those six factors was precisely whether the fee was 
contingent.51 Why, then, were contingent fees subject to such additional 
scrutiny? Why insult the lawyer who worked for contingent fees with the 
presumption that he would charge extravagant fees for minimal service? 
Many of the contingent fee lawyers were foreign-born; many were the chil-
dren of foreign-born parents; almost all were from poor backgrounds; all 
were representing clients bringing claims against the Canon-drafters' cli-
ents. That, it seems, was reason enough. 
Waves of immigrants strained and blurred the legal profession's self-
image. A crisis of identity ensued. The profession had choices. Look out-
ward at a changing population to be served by lawyers and expand the vi-
sion of what lawyers do and for whom, or attempt to still the advances of 
time and culture and demographics to maintain the status quo in the profes-
sion. The legal profession chose the latter. 
44. Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 556 (1877). 
45. See A.B.A. Comm. on Code of Prof! Ethics, supra note 30, at 678; see also 
Molitemo, supra note 3, at 789. 
46. See A.B.A. Comm. on Code of Prof! Ethics, supra note 30, at 709. While most 
of the codes did say that contingent fees "lead to many abuses," and that "certain compensa-
tion is to be preferred," no strictures were leveled against them that were not leveled against 
other forms of compensation. ld at 710. 
47. DRINKER, supra note 25, at 65. 
48. ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, Canon 13. 
49. /d. Canon 13. 
50. Jd Canon 12. 
51. /d. 
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The animus against the new lawyers is nowhere more evident than in 
the matters of ambulance chasing and the contingent fee, an animus which 
was enshrined in the code of ethics which governed the legal profession 
until 1969,52 and persisted thereafter until the Supreme Court trimmed the 
bar's sails based on First Amendment application.53 The two issues are 
commingled so thoroughly that even the contradictions of the hatred of 
them cannot be extricated. Indeed, often the elite's hatred of one contradict-
ed its rationale for hatred of the other. 
The standard condemnation of ambulance chasing, for example, in-
cluding its system of runners who informed injured parties of their claims 
and recommended the services of a lawyer, was that it created litigation 
which would not otherwise have existed, fomenting disputes and otherwise 
disrupting society. The ABA condemned it on these grounds, declaring that 
it was "[ s ]tirring up strife and litigation" and that "to breed litigation by 
seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other 
grounds of action"54 was an unethical practice. However, the contingent fee 
upon which these ambulance chasers rested their practices was condemned 
upon the exactly opposite grounds. The elite contended that, because it was 
more lucrative for the contingent fee lawyer to settle a case than to litigate 
it, that an ambulance chaser on a contingent fee was likely to settle rather 
than litigate, which might injure the interests of his client. 55 Their criticisms 
have come full circle; ambulance chasing was unethical because it stirred up 
litigation, whereas the contingent fee was unethical because it encouraged 
settlement rather than litigation. The new legal underclass simply could not 
win; but that was, after all, the idea. 
The legal profession's official response to changing demographics was 
to resist their reality. For at least forty years while the face of America 
changed, the legal profession tried in vain to remain unchanged. The futility 
of such an effort is apparent. The cost in terms of lost opportunities to ex-
pand the understanding of what lawyers can do for the society is immeasur-
able.56 The changes in advertising rules, heightening of educational stand-
ards, and enhanced resistance to contingent fees changed nothing about the 
52. Molitemo, supra note 3, at 792 ("The 1908 Canons remained the official gov-
erning norm of the legal profession until the ABA promulgated a comprehensive reformula-
tion in 1969."). 
53. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 385 (1977). 
54. ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, Canon 28. 
55. See Legal Ethics: Ambulance Chasing, supra note 29, at 185. 
56. In addition to these efforts to debilitate the practice of the new lawyers, the 
organized bar sought to prevent as many as possible from entering the profession at all. Rais-
ing educational standards for admission, enforcing the emerging good character requirement 
in discriminatory ways, and adding citizenship requirements were all partly motivated by an 
effort to '"purify the stream [of lawyers] at its source."' AUERBACH, supra note 8, at 113. 
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lives of the elite lawyers who spearheaded the changes, except to protect 
them and their clients from the new class of plaintiffs' lawyers. 
B. Example 2: Watergate "American Lawyers-A Sick Profession?"57 
The sense of crisis overwhelmed the legal profession in the wake of 
the Watergate revelations. The prominent role of lawyers in the scandals 
presented an unprecedented public relations crisis for the profession. 
And now, once again, with the advent of new scandals in Washington in which a 
number of lawyers have been accused of unethical conduct, our profession is once 
more faced with a crisis and our stock has sunk to what is, perhaps, its lowest point 
in the past twenty years. 58 
Watergate has sent a pall over the country and a shadow over our profession. 
While it is patently unfair to blame our profession for Watergate just because many 
participants happen to be lawyers, I do think that the blame that has been cast upon 
us ultimately will have a healthy effect on the profession and a positive influence 
on the country. We have been compelled to recognize that we must move deliber-
ately but more quickly to provide additional protection for the public and to disci-
pline those among us who are not following the highest principles of the profes-
sion. 59 
In 1975, the ABA's Standing Committee on Professional Discipline 
reported on the progress of state bar discipline of those involved in Wa-
tergate, but emphasized that "Watergate is regarded as a national problem, 
and the profession's efforts to cope with it will be assessed on a national 
basis."60 
The legal profession was enormously embarrassed by the Watergate 
scandals. Lawyer after lawyer, many, including many high government of-
ficials, were shown to be involved in various politically-motivated crimes 
and shenanigans. Checks were doctored; files stolen; financial and other 
records destroyed; letters forged. Lawyers were deeply involved.61 The tum-
57. America's Lawyers: A Sick Profession? U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 25, 
1974, at 23. 
58. Burton B. Laub, Dean, Dickinson Sch. of Law, Law-A Bad Trade but a Noble 
Profession, Address at Joint Luncheon of National Conference of Bar Examiners (Aug. 7, 
1973), in 42 B. EXAMINER 156, 157 (1973). 
59. Chesterfield Smith, 1973-74: Activity on Many Fronts for the Association, 60 
A.B.A. J. 1041, 1041 (1974); see also Robert W. Meserve, The Legal Profession and Wa-
tergate, 59 A.B.A. J. 985 (1973) (suggesting in 1973 that the national profession must re-
spond to the national crisis created by Watergate). 
60. A.B.A. Comm. on Prof! Discipline, Report of the Standing Committee on Pro-
fessional Discipline, I 00 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 324, 325 (1975). 
61. See Robert W. Meserve, President's Page: Watergate: Lessons and Challenges 
for the Legal Profession, 59 A.B.A. J. 681, 681 (1973) (stating that "[t]he Watergate scandal, 
its ramifications still unfolding, is certain to rank as a dark episode in our political history. It 
has posed serious challenges to the legal profession because lawyers in high places are 
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around from pride in Richard Nixon and his key men as lawyers to shame 
was swift. In 1969, ABA President William Gossett proudly connected the 
legal profession to Nixon and his men: 
Let me record in passing that not only is President Nixon a lawyer; twelve mem-
bers of his cabinet and sub-cabinet also are members of the profession. And no 
fewer than fifteen of the President's appointments to key positions in federal agen-
cies have been lawyers who have been active as officers or as Section or Commit-
tee chairmen of the Association.62 
By 1972, the ABA was racing to distance itself from any connection 
with the President and his men. 
Watergate occurred in the midst of a period marked by a massive shift 
in social thinking about those in authority. Watergate was the capper and 
not the onset of society's mistrust of authority and public officials. 
Throughout the preceding decade, slogans like, "Think for yourself' and 
"Question Authority" were popularized by Timothy Leary and others.63 The 
civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, and the early stages of the 
women's movement all partook in a strong measure of mistrust of official-
dom. By the time the Watergate dust settled, the nation had had its fill with 
those in authority. Watergate expanded those to be mistrusted to lawyers in 
a new and powerful way. 
Perhaps no single event had ever created such an enormous crisis for 
the legal profession as did the Watergate break-in and cover-up. In one 
stroke, the legal profession found itself in the cross-hairs of the public and 
potential public regulators. And in that same stroke, the nation found a focal 
point for the building skepticism of leaders and government and authority 
that had been growing during the preceding decade. As much as the embar-
rassment of so many lawyers being involved in the scandal, the legal profes-
sion's responsibility for the justice system and leadership in the government 
brought the profession into public scrutiny. 
The measure of embarrassment was so great that the word "Wa-
tergate" could barely be uttered in official ABA writings.64 The ABA even 
among those linked with it and because the faith of the American people in the justice sys-
tem, and in the governmental structure itself, are at stake."). 
62. William T. Gossett, President's Page: The State of the Union, 55 A.B.A. J. 699, 
699 (1969). 
63. The term was later attributed to Leary, but all who lived through the time recall 
the familiar bumper sticker. See, e.g., Phillip E. Johnson, The Creationist and the Sociobiol-
ogist: Two Stories About Illiberal Education, 80 CALF. L. REv. 1071, 1071 (1992) ("The 
student revolt of the 1960s opened with a 'Free Speech Movement,' and the bumper sticker 
that directs us to 'Question Authority' .... "). 
64. See Watergate, Sex, and Marijuana Dominate Debate at Washington August 
Meeting, 59 A.B.A. J. 1131, 1132 (1973) (stating that "[t]he action on Watergate consisted of 
a resolution, which declared that the Association 'condemns and denounces any action on the 
part of members of the legal profession which might cast aspersions upon the integrity of the 
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managed to adopt a resolution reaffirming its ethics code and condemning 
those involved in the Watergate crimes without mentioning the word "Wa-
tergate:" 
"WHEREAS, The Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated by the Amer-
ican Bar Association and adopted by the various jurisdictions, recognizes the vital 
role of the lawyer in the preservation of society and is predicated upon the obliga-
tion of lawyers to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct; and 
WHEREAS, The code specifically enjoins lawyers from all illegal and morally 
reprehensible conduct; and 
WHEREAS, Congressional and judicial proceedings and reports of the news media 
have disclosed alleged instances of professional misconduct by members of the le-
gal profession; and 
WHEREAS, The American Bar Association recognizes that a primary objective of 
the organized bar is the preservation of the integrity of our system of ordered liber-
ty under law; and 
WHEREAS, It is in the interest of the profession, the public, and any individuals 
involved that appropriate proceedings be instituted properly; 
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association reaffirms its dedication to 
the ethical standards as set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility; and 
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Association condemns and denounces any ac-
tion on the part of members of the legal profession which might cast aspersions 
upon the integrity of the profession; and 
FURTHER RESOLVED, That those lawyers whose conduct contravenes the Code 
of Professional Responsibility should be subjected to prompt and vigorous disci-
plinary investigation and appropriate action should be taken forthwith; and 
FURTHER RESOLVED, That a certified copy of this resolution be sent to the Bar 
Associations of all states.'.65 
The ABA moved swiftly to quell the disastrous public reaction to the 
legal profession's perceived ethical lapse, and with some measure of cover. 
Although the move toward some reforms preceded Watergate, during the 
next few years, the ABA pushed through approval of the MPRE, approval 
of the ethics requirement for law schools, and set the Kutak Commission to 
its work of making the lawyer ethics code more law-like.66 The positive 
profession' and calls for prompt disciplinary action against lawyers whose conduct violates 
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The resolution as adopted omits any direct reference 
to the Watergate affair."). 
65. Id. at 1132. 
66. See House Disapproves UMVARA, Supports the Exclusionary Rule, and Adopts 
New Law School Standards, 59 A.B.A. J. 384, 384 (1973) ("The actions that prompted the 
most debate were: .... Law school standards. The house approved a complete revision of the 
Association's standards for the approval of law schools, but only after amending the stand-
ards to require instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession."). 
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changes made by the profession were reactive and not proactive.67 They 
were what the profession needed to do to dampen the fire of negative public 
opinion. The need for such changes could easily enough have been foreseen 
by a profession better in tune with the rising distrust of public officials, 
government, and authority generally. Society had for a decade begun to 
question authority and demand more openness and accountability. The good 
that could have been done by a profession able to make proactive changes to 
enhance ethics training for lawyers and modification of its code to a more 
law-like format was lost. Instead, the profession regulated itself only in re-
sponse to embarrassment and scandal. It engaged in regulation-by-crisis. 
The society's sense of the profession's genuineness in enhancing its ethics 
training was predictably dubious. 
What did the profession do? In the weeks, months, and years follow-
ing Watergate's major revelations, the American legal profession moved to 
require all freshly-minted lawyers take a course in lawyer ethics and pass a 
lawyer ethics exam.68 Even more fundamentally, it charged a commission 
with the responsibility of revamping its own model ethics code, adopted 
only two years prior to the onset of the Watergate defalcations. 
1. Lawyer Ethics in Law Schools 
In the days and months following the major Watergate revelations, the 
ABA moved to spearhead the addition of lawyer ethics courses in law 
schools, first proposing that law schools offer such courses and then as Wa-
tergate-fever intensified, mandating that law schools require such courses of 
all students. In the end, no one could earn a degree from an ABA-accredited 
law school without a course on lawyer ethics, including the then-dominant 
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. And without a degree 
from an ABA accredited law school, only a handful of states permit one to 
take the bar exam. In effect, the ABA required that nearly every future law-
yer will study its model code of ethics. What better way to demonstrate to 
the public that the dominant lawyer organization cares about lawyer ethics? 
It is true that the accreditation standard regarding law school teaching 
of lawyer ethics (Section 302) existed in draft form prior to the Watergate 
scandal, and the scholarly attribution of Section 302's adoption to Wa-
67. See Robert W. Meserve, The Legal Profession and Watergate, 59 A.B.A.J. 985, 
986 (1973) ("We must act in the present era of anxiety to sustain and serve the moral and 
tolerant tradition that has taken generations of patient effort to create."). 
68. Joe E. Covington & Eugene L. Smith, Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination, 50 B. EXAMINER 21, 21, 22 (1981) ("Following Watergate, public attention was 
strongly focused on the ethical standards of the legal profession .... The purpose ofMPRE is 
not to exclude persons from the practice of law, but it is to ensure that persons admitted to 
the bar are prepared to cope with ethical problems in the practice of law."). 
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tergate has been mixed. 69 Some claim that the existence of the draft prior to 
Watergate makes Watergate a watered-down cause of the resolution's adop-
tion. 70 But the draft that existed before the full Watergate affair came to 
light did not mandate that law schools require a course in lawyer ethics. It 
merely required that law schools offer such a course, along with several 
others required to be offered by the same provision. 71 The motion to amend 
the draft resolution came during the February 1973 floor debate, when a 
motion brought by the State Bar of Arizona was passed in the House of 
Delegates. 72 So the weak draft that existed before Watergate became a much 
stronger mandate by floor action in 1973, by which time there were new 
Watergate revelations emerging almost daily. Although it did not begin 
69. Paul T. Hayden, Putting Ethics to the (National Standardized) Test: Tracing the 
Origins of the Empire, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1299, 1332, 1333 (2003) (suggesting no connec-
tion, "It is tempting to attribute the adoption of Standard 302(a) to the Watergate scandal, but 
such a literal connection simply cannot exist." But acknowledging that "[s]cholars are cer-
tainly not wrong to connect Watergate to the rapid creation of required ethics courses in law 
schools~that did generally occur after the full lawyer involvement in the scandal had be-
come clear~but Standard 302(a) itself was motivated much more by the burgeoning enroll-
ments .... "(footnotes omitted)); Kathleen Clark, The Legacy of Watergate for Legal Ethics 
Instruction, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 673, 673 (2000) (suggesting connection, "The profession ap-
parently felt that it had to do something to repair the image of lawyers, and in 1974 the ABA 
did indeed take action. What kind of reforms did the ABA adopt in order to prevent future 
Watergates? The ABA adopted an accreditation requirement that law schools ensure that 
each graduate receive instruction in legal ethics."); Philip C. Kissam, Lurching Towards the 
Millennium: The Law School, the Research University, and the Professional Reforms of 
Legal Education, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1965, 1984 (1999) (suggesting connection, "[T]he Wa-
tergate affair aroused public and professional concerns about the ethical behavior of lawyers, 
and the profession responded by establishing a professional ethics part to state bar examina-
tions and by requiring law schools to teach 'legal ethics."'); Robert Macerate, Educating a 
Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1099, 1123 (1997) (sug-
gesting connection, "The 1973 [accreditation standards] recognized developments in clinical 
skills instruction as well as the growing attention to professional responsibility in law school 
curricula .... 'but in August 1974, in the wake of Watergate,' the following specification 
was added to the Standard: 'Such required instruction need not be limited to any pedagogical 
method as long as the history, goals, structure and responsibilities of the legal profession and 
its members, including [the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility] are all covered."' 
(second alteration in original)); Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and 
Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145, 148 (1996) 
(suggesting connection, discussion of the ABA requirement of accredited law schools to 
teach professional responsibility was "[t]irst adopted in August, 1973, in the midst of the 
Watergate disclosures"). 
70. Hayden, supra note 69, at 1332. 
71. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A.B.A., Report No. 1 of 
the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, 98 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 351, 354 
(1973) (Section 302(a) reads, "The law school shall offer: (i) instruction in those subjects 
generally regarded as the core of the law school curriculum, (ii) Training in professional 
skills, such as counseling, the drafting of legal documents and materials, and trial and appel-
late advocacy, (iii) Instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession"). 
72. House Disapproves UMVARA, supra note 66, at 388-90. 
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hearings until May, the Senate Select Committee (chaired by Sam Ervin) 
was formed on February 7, 1973. A month earlier still, when Judge Sirica 
opened the Watergate burglars' trial on January 7, federal investigators al-
ready knew of the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREEP) slush fund 
used to finance illegal activities against Democrats.73 The convictions of 
McCord and Liddy were entered on January 30. As far back as August 1, 
1972, The Washington Post reported that funds meant for CRP had been 
deposited in a Watergate burglar's account.14 Of the floor amendment adop-
tion in 1973, ABA President Robert Meserve said that this amendment evi-
denced the ABA's "desire that there be greater law school emphasis on the 
teaching of professional responsibility."75 Although it is fair to say that the 
major revelations were yet to come when the ethics course requirement was 
adopted in February 1973, the lawyer-involvement in Watergate writing 
was on the wall. 
Furthermore, consideration of pre-existing lawyer ethics proposals 
changed in Watergate's wake. To be adopted after Watergate, even pre-
existing proposals had to meet the standard of aiding the recuperation of an 
ailing profession in public eyes. For example, in 1975, the ABA held a con-
ference in Chicago to discuss a draft of new rules that would reform its 
highly restrictive advertising rules. They concluded, however, that advertis-
ing would only serve to fortify the public's qualms with the profession.76 
The fear of added public displeasure caused the bar to maintain an out-of-
date status quo that would soon be stricken as unconstitutional by the Su-
preme Court.77 In doing so, the Court cited societal change and sounded the 
strong consumerist notes that had emerged in the prior decade. So the pre-
existence of Section 302 as one provision in a package of accreditation 
changes does not disconnect its adoption from Watergate. Its adoption 
would be touted as a way for the profession to enhance public perception of 
its efforts to instill ethical norms in lawyers.78 
73. The Watergate Files-The Watergate Trial: Overview, GERALD R. FORD 
LIBRARY & MUSEUM, http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/museum/exhibits/watergate_ 
files/content.php?section=l&page=a (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). 
74. Watergate: Brief Timeline of Events, WATERGATE.INFO, http://watergate.info/ 
chronology/brief.shtml (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
75. Robert W. Meserve, President's Page: House Charts Association Course in 
Critical Areas, 59 A.B.A. 1. 327, 327 (1973). 
76. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 91 (1978). 
77. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
78. Meserve, supra note 75, at 327 (highlighting this change as evidence of the 
ABA's, "desire that there be greater law school emphasis on the teaching of professional 
responsibility"). 
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2.MPRE 
Post-Watergate, the profession moved to show its concern about law-
yer ethics by adding a national lawyer ethics exam to the bar admission pro-
cess. 79 The Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam came into being 
and flourished in the latter half of the 1970s. 80 
Its creation is credited to the National Conference of Bar Examiners 
(NCBE). The NCBE came into existence in 1931 as the states were estab-
lishing formal bar exams as entry gates to the profession.81 The establish-
ment of bar exams was one of many entry barriers established as an out-
growth of the profession's reaction to the wave of immigrants in the first 
third of the century Y 
The NCBE is a nonprofit and was founded in 1931.83 It is a U.S. based 
nonprofit organization that developed the standardized tests for admission to 
the bar exam in individual states.84 The MBE resulted from "a universal 
concern among bar examiners regarding the mounting burden of preparing 
and grading papers in the light of the ... increase in law school enrollment" 
during the late 1960s.85 The present bar exam format, a 200 question, multi-
ple-choice, multistate exam (the MBE), combined with a set of essay ques-
tions on state law, dates from only the 1970s.86 The MBE was added to the 
bar exam in February 1972 as a way to both increase efficiency of grading 
and aid in ensuring as much fairness as possible.87 NCBE's mission, as per 
its website is: 
o to work with other institutions to develop, maintain, and apply reasonable and 
uniform standards of education and character for eligibility for admission to the 
practice of law; and 
o to assist bar admission authorities by 
-providing standardized examinations of uniform and high quality for the testing 
of applicants for admission to the practice of law, 
--disseminating relevant information concerning admission standards and practic-
es, 
79. Leslie C. Levin, The MPRE Reconsidered, 86 KY. L.J. 395,399 n.l4 (1997). 
80. ld. 
81. About Us: NCBE Mission, NCBE (2011), http://www.ncbex.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2012). 
82. See supra Section I.A. 
83. About Us: NCBE Mission, supra note 81. 
84. !d. 
85. John Eckler, The Multistate Bar Examination: Its Origins and Objectives, 65 B. 
EXAMINER 14, 15 (1996). 
86. Society of American Law Teachers Statement on the Bar Exam, July 2002, 52 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 446, 446 (2002). 
87. About Us: NCBE Mission, supra note 81. 
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--conducting educational programs for the members and staffs of such authorities, 
and 
-providing other services such as character and fitness investigations and re-
search.88 
Although some have discounted the MPRE success story's connection 
to Watergate, the profession's consistent efforts in the 1970s to upgrade its 
public image as ethics-sensitive is too much to ignore.89 Even those who 
discount the connection acknowledge "that several strong historical forces 
coalesced in the late 1970s to propel the MPRE' s initial development ... 
• "
90 Watergate was not merely among those strong historical forces, it 
played a major role in generating them, even if sometimes referred to by 
MPRE Committee drafters as "the involvement of prominent lawyers in 
widely publicized political scandals."91 Others were more open in attributing 
credit for the increased attention on ethical testing to Watergate.92 
3. Quick Move to New Code, Kutak Commission 
The existing lawyer code at the time of Watergate was the nearly-
new, unanimously adopted93 Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 
said by Lewis Powell, the ABA President who launched the Model Code 
drafting committee, to "truly reflect[] the essential spirit and ideals of our 
profession."94 The ink was barely dry on the new ABA Model Code when 
the CREEP and its so-called "plumbers" began their political crimes and 
shenanigans, including the dismantling of Edmund Muskie's campaign.95 
The ABA Canons of Legal Ethics had lasted for more than sixty years; but 
in Watergate's wake, the ABA would set the Kutak Commission to work at 
revamping the Model Code a mere seven years after its much-ballyhooed 
adoption. 
"The social climate mandating improvements in ethical standards 
arose in the wake of the Watergate scandal. ... Because of problems with 
the Code and public perception of the profession, the ABA formed another 
88. /d. 
89. See Hayden, supra note 69, at 1301. 
90. /d. 
91. Eugene Scoles, A Decade in the Development and Drafting of the Multistate 
Professional Responsibility Examination, 59 B. EXAMINER 20, 21 (1990). 
92. Covington & Smith, supra note 68. 
93. Bernard G. Segal, President's Page, 55 A.B.A. J. 893,893 (1969). 
94. Association's House of Delegates Meets in Dallas, August 11-13,55 A.B.A. J. 
970, 970 (1969) (quoting Lewis F. Powell, Jr.). 
95. Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Demo-
crats, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1972, at AI. 
Crisis Regulation 331 
commission to reconsider the established standards."96 The "transformation 
of legal ethical standards from internal fraternal norms to public code of 
law, though met with considerable resistance in the legal community, was a 
necessary response to diminishing public faith in lawyers."97 "The result 
was a new era of intensified internal regulation, and external scrutiny by 
courts and legislatures."98 
Despite the claim that the new code would repair Watergate-related 
problems of the 1969 Code, the ABA chose not to adopt provisions that 
might actually do so. Proposed rules included a disclosure provision that 
would allow an attorney to disclose information if the head of an organiza-
tion insisted on committing illegal activities that were detrimental to the 
organization.99 However, the ABA decided to draft a rule that only allowed 
the attorney to withdraw from representation, which is in essence what the 
CRP attorneys did. 100 The ABA also refused to adopt a proposed confidenti-
ality provision that would allow attorneys to disclose a client's fraud in or-
der to rectify the consequences of that fraud. The best the new ABA code 
did was allow for a "noisy withdrawal," meaning that an attorney could 
disclose the fact that he or she was withdrawing and possibly alert the pub-
lic about a potential problem. Many critics were disappointed by the ABA's 
decisions on new Code provisions, and some states did not adopt the pro-
posed amendments. Eighteen years after the ABA's adoption of the Model 
Rules, a mere four states had approved codes based on the Model Rules 101 
Again, as had been the case in the early part of the Century, the re-
forms and changes imposed no burden on the lawyers who created the 
changes. Increased ethics teaching in law schools, an additional hurdle in 
the bar admission process, and the modest changes to the substance of the 
ethics code would have no effect on established lawyers. In essence, change 
was no change for them. 
96. Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance 
of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. REv. 699, 710 (1998). 
97. Audrey I. Benison, The Sophisticated Client: A Proposal for the Reconciliation 
of Conflicts of Interest Standards for Attorneys and Accountants. 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
699, 708 (2000). 
98. /d. (footnote omitted}. 
99. ABA, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY of THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT91 (1987)(citing Commission Proposed Rule l.l3(c)). 
100. Id. 
101. Chronological List of States Adopting Model Rules, ABA CENT. FOR PROF. 
RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_ 
rules_ of _professional_ conduct/chrono _list_ state _adopting_ model_ rules.html (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2012). 
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C. Example 3: Multijurisdictional Practice and Globalization 
Dynamic change "over the last century" in the nature of law practice, 
especially its increasingly cross-border nature, inspired the ABA to estab-
lish the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission in 2000. 102 It engaged in a 
wide gathering of information for its lawyer-membership to consider. When 
it issued its final report, the tone appeared to foretell major recommenda-
tions for change. It recited considerable evidence that would support major 
change, including the abolition of the anachronistic, outdated state-by-state 
licensing system. But after the bold-sounding build-up, its first recommen-
dation was to preserve the state-by-state licensing system in the U.S. 
From the Report: 
In the early twentieth century, states adopted "unauthorized practice of law" (UPL) 
provisions that apply equally to lawyers licensed in other states and to nonlawyers. 
These laws prohibit lawyers from engaging in the practice of law except in states in 
which they are licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law. UPL restrictions 
have long been qualified by pro hac vice provisions, which allow courts or admin-
istrative agencies to authorize an out-of-state lawyer to represent a client in a par-
ticular case before the tribunal. In recent years, some jurisdictions have adopted 
provisions authorizing out-of-state lawyers to perform other legal work in the ju-
risdiction. 
Jurisdictional restrictions on law practice were not historically a matter of concern, 
because most clients' legal matters were confined to a single state and a lawyer's 
familiarity with that state's law was a qualification of particular importance. How-
ever, the wisdom of the application of UPL laws to licensed lawyers has been 
questioned repeatedly since the 1960s in light of the changing nature of clients' le-
gal needs and the changing nature of law practice. Both the law and the transac-
tions in which lawyers assist clients have increased in complexity, requiring a 
growing number of lawyers to concentrate in particular areas of practice rather than 
being generalists in state law. Often, the most significant qualification to render as-
sistance in a legal matter is not knowledge of any given state's law, but knowledge 
of federal or international law or familiarity with a particular type of business or 
personal transaction or legal proceeding. Additionally, modem transportation and 
communications technology have enabled clients to travel easily and transact busi-
ness throughout the country, and even internationally. Because of this globalization 
of business and finance, clients sometimes now need lawyers to assist them in 
transactions in multiple jurisdictions (state and national) or to advise them about 
multiple jurisdictions' laws. 
Although client needs and legal practices have evolved, lawyer regulation has not 
yet responded effectively to that evolution. As the work of lawyers has become 
more varied, specialized and national in scope, it has become increasingly uncer-
tain when a lawyer's work (other than as a trial lawyer in court) implicates the 
UPL law of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not licensed. Lawyers recognize 
that the geographic scope of a lawyer's practice must be adequate to enable the 
lawyer to serve the legal needs of clients in a national and global economy. They 
have expressed concern that if UPL restrictions are applied literally to United 
102. ABA, REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON MUL TIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE 2-3 (2002). 
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States lawyers who perform any legal work outside the jurisdictions in which they 
are admitted to practice, the laws will impede lawyers' ability to meet their clients' 
multi-state and interstate legal needs efficiently and effectively. 
This concern was sharpened by the California Supreme Court decision, Birbrower, 
Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P. C. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 949 
P.2d I (Cal.1998), which held that lawyers not licensed to practice law in Califor-
nia violated California's misdemeanor UPL provision when they assisted a Cali-
fornia corporate client in connection with an impending California arbitration un-
der California law, and were therefore barred from recovering fees under a written 
fee agreement for services the lawyers rendered while they were physically or "vir-
tually" in California. Although the state law was subsequently and temporarily 
amended to allow out-of-state lawyers to obtain £ennission to participate in certain 
California arbitrations, concerns have persisted. 1 3 
The Commission recommends: 
I. The ABA affirm its support for the principle of state judicial regulation of the 
practice oflaw. 104 
II. TODA Y'S CRISIS 
333 
Today's American legal profession, already wracked with uncertainty 
because of the late 90s rise of unofficial MDPs and the Enron debacle, 
found itself a victim of the mid to late-2000s economic crisis. Calls for abo-
lition of state-by-state licensure resulted in the modest changes eventually 
adopted to multijurisdictional practice restrictions.105 Enron and the resulting 
SEC reforms temporarily quelled the call for MDP approval. 106 Then the 
economic crisis, even as Australia and the UK were adopting major provi-
sions, allowing alternative business structures and outside investment on 
law firms. 107 
A. Global Financial Crisis 
The global economy has been in decline for the latter part of the 
2000s. The origins of this crisis can be traced back to the burst of the tech 
bubble in the late 1990s. 108 The decline in the stock market beginning in 
2000 and subsequent recession in 2001 led to the Federal Reserve dramati-
103. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
104. Id. at 5. 
105. Id. at 5-6; MODEL RULES OFPROF'LOF CONDUCTR. 5.5 (2006). 
I 06. Sarbanes--Oxlery Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. I 07-204, 116 Stat 745 (2002). See 
also Robert R. Keatinge, Multidimensional Practice in a World of Invincible Ignorance: 
MDB, MJP, and Ancillary Business after Enron, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 71 7, 718-19 (2002). 
107. Legal Profession Act 2004 (Nsw) 112 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii. 
edu.au/au!legis/nsw/conso1_act/lpa2004179/a; Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (Nsw) reg 
455 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_reg/lpr2005270/. 
108. Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2011, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_ crisis/index.html. 
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cally lowering interest rates. 109 Lower interest rates led to greater demand 
for homes, which in tum increased prices. 110 Many homeowners at this time 
also refinanced their homes. 111 As the housing market experienced growth, 
banks increasingly made subprime loans with homeowners, which are high-
risk loans given to homeowners with poor credit histories. 112 These high-risk 
loans, along with other assets, were mixed together to create collateralized 
debt obligations, which were then sold to global investors. 113 
Interest rates then rose from 1% to 5.35% from 2004 to 2006, which 
triggered a slowdown in the housing market. 114 Homeowners began to de-
fault on their mortgages, as many could barely afford the payments when 
interest rates were low. 115 The defaults on subprime loans impacted banks 
worldwide. 116 In June 2007, Bear Stems announced the collapse of two 
hedge funds it owned. 117 These funds had been heavily invested in the sub-
prime market. 118 Liquidity in the credit market dried up, and the rate at 
which banks would lend to each other increased sharply. 119 In September 
2007, Northern Rock, a British bank, asked for emergency financial support 
from the Bank of England, as the lack of liquidity in the credit markets dried 
up its funding. 120 The day after this announcement, depositors withdrew 
large sums of money, creating for the largest run on a British bank for over 
a century. 121 The next month, several other investment banks, including 
UBS, Citigroup, and Merrill Lynch, all announced billions of dollars in 
losses related to subprime investments. 122 
The Federal Reserve took several steps to help the situation on Wall 
Street. 123 In March 2008, the Fed assumed $30 billion in Bear Steams lia-
bilities and helped engineer a sale of the investment bank to JP Morgan 
Chase to prevent its bankruptcy. 124 However, losses on Wall Street contin-
ued, with the subprime crisis spreading to other sectors, including commer-
109. !d. 
110. !d. 
Ill. /d. 
112. Timeline: Credit Crunch to Downturn, BBC NEWS, Aug. 7, 2009, 
http:/ /news. bbc.co. uk/2/hi/business/7 521250.stm#tab I e. 
113. /d. 
114. !d. 
115. Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, supra note 108. 
116. !d. 
117. !d. 
118. !d. 
119. Timeline: Credit Crunch to Downturn, supra note 112. 
120. !d. 
121. !d. 
122. !d. 
123. Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, supra note I 08. 
124. !d. 
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cial property, consumer debt, and company debt. 125 Concerns over the slid-
ing stock prices of Freddie Mae and Freddie Mac, the U.S.'s largest lenders, 
led to government takeover of these entities on September 7, 2008. 126 A few 
days later, government and finance officials gathered to discuss the fate of 
investment bank Lehman Brothers, which was facing bankruptcy. 127 This 
time, the U.S. government failed to intervene, and Lehman collapsed, the 
first major bank to do so since the beginning of the credit crisis. 128 Merrill 
Lynch, in order to avoid the fate of Lehman, sold itself to Bank of America 
that month. 129 AIG, the U.S.'s largest insurance company, was then bailed 
out by the government with an $85 billion rescue package. 130 
On September 18, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson announced a 
$700 billion government proposal to bail out the U.S.'s largest banks by 
buying toxic assets from major banking institutions. 131 This plan was de-
signed to increase confidence in the U.S. markets and improve the banks' 
balance sheets. 132 The bailout plan was the largest U.S. government inter-
vention into the financial markets since the Great Depression. 133 Days after 
Congress approve the bailout package, European countries also followed 
suit with bailouts for Hypo Real Estate, a large German lender, and Fortis, a 
major European financial company. 134 
In November, stocks fell to their lowest levels in a decade, while un-
employment reached its highest level in fifteen years. 135 Home prices fell, 
and retailers suffered major losses, with stores such as Sharper Image, Cir-
cuit City, and Linens 'n Things filing for bankruptcy. 136 The Fed cut its 
benchmark interest rate to an unprecedented rate of nearly zero percent in 
December, while other nations cut interest rates as wel1. 137 
In the beginning of 2009, Congress passed a $787 billion stimulus 
package to revive the U.S. economy. 138 By the summer of 2009, it seemed 
that a total financial meltdown had been avoided, and by the end of the year 
major banks reported large profits and were in the process of repaying the 
bailout money they had received from the U.S. government. 139 However, 
125. Timeline: Credit Crunch to Downturn, supra note 112. 
126. Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, supra note 108. 
127. /d. 
128. /d. 
129. /d. 
130. /d. 
131. /d. 
132. /d. 
133. Timeline: Credit Crunch to Downturn, supra note 112. 
134. !d. 
135. Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, supra note 108. 
136. /d. 
137. !d. 
138. /d. 
139. /d. 
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despite the increased stability in the financial markets, throughout 2009 
unemployment levels rose to the highest seen in a generation. 140 The U.S. 
unemployment rate rose from 5.0% in December 2007 to 9.9% in December 
2009. 141 
B. Impact on U.S. Legal Market 
The decline in the U.S. economy had a major impact on the legal mar-
ket. Law firms had hired more employees during the early economic boom 
of the 2000s, with an emphasis on adding attorneys to corporate law prac-
tice groups. 142 With the downturn in the financial sector, however, firms had 
to drastically reduce the number of attorneys in these practice groups. 143 
Firms shifted attorneys in corporate practice areas, like real estate and secu-
ritization practice groups, into other areas, such as bankruptcy .144 
Instead of merely shifting practice groups, other law firms reacted to 
the economic downturn with large attorney layoffs. In 2009, law firms laid 
off 12,259 attorneys and staff, often in large numbers at once. 145 In early 
February 2009, six major law firms-Bryan Cave, Dechert, DLA Piper, 
Faegre & Benson, Goodwin Procter, and Holland & Knight-reported large 
attorney and staff layoffs. 146 On one day alone in late February 2009, Lat-
ham and Watkins laid off 440 employees, a total of 190 attorneys and 250 
staff. 147 During a two-week period that March, law firm layoffs totaled near-
ly 2,700. 148 While not as massive, an additional 234 lawyers and 511 staff-
ers, a total of745 law firm employees, were laid off in 2010. 149 Even more 
drastic than layoffs, several firms ceased to exist in light of the poor eco-
nomic conditions. Wolf Block of Philadelphia and Thelen and Heller Ehr-
I40. !d. 
I41. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, http://data.bis.gov/timeseries/LNSI4000000 (last visited Feb. I, 20I2). 
I42. Michael J. de Ia Merced, The Legal Profession Feels the Pain of Recession, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, at F2. 
I43. !d. 
I44. Id. 
I45. Debra Cassens Weiss, 2010 Sees a Huge Dropoff in BigLaw Layoffs; Fewer 
than 800 Job Losses Chronicled, ABA J., Jan. 25, 20I1, http://www.abajoumal.com/news/ 
article/20 I 0 _sees_ a_ huge_ dropoff _in_ biglaw _layoffs _fewer _than_ 800 job _losses_ chroni/. 
I46. Martha Neil, Bloody Thursday: 6 Major Law Firms Ax Attorneys, ABA J., Feb. 
I2, 2009, http://www.abajoumal.com/news/articlelbloody _thursday_ 4_major _law _firms_ ax_ 
attorneys_ more _layoffs_ at_ others/. 
147. Ashby Jones, Law Firm Layoff Watch: Latham Cuts /90 Lawyers, 250 Staff, 
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, Feb. 27, 2009, http:/lblogs.wsj.corn/law/2009/02/27/law-firm-layoff-
watch-latham-cuts-I90-lawyers-250-staff/. 
148. Martha Neil, March Mayhem: Law Firm Layoffs in I Week Total Nearly 1,500, 
ABA J., Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/march_mayhem_law_firm_ 
layoffs_top_500_today_over_I200_since_friday/. 
149. Weiss, supra note 145. 
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man of San Francisco dissolved, leaving many attorneys without employ-
ment.15o 
As the availability of legal jobs decreased, the number of newly-
minted lawyers wanting employment increased. In recent years there has 
been an increase in the number of law schools and law degrees awarded. In 
2006, 43,883 juris doctor degrees were awarded, an increase from 2002, in 
which 37,909 were awarded, according to the American Bar Association. 151 
There was also an 11% increase in the number of AHA-accredited law 
schools since 1995, with the total now at 196.152 Many universities see value 
in adding law schools in terms of prestige and financial benefits. Law 
schools are often money-makers for universities, as "[ c ]osts are low com-
pared with other graduate schools and classrooms can be large."153 
Along with the number of juris doctor degrees awarded, the amount 
charged in tuition has also rapidly increased in recent years. Tuition has 
almost tripled the rate of inflation during the past twenty years. In 2006, 
graduates of public law schools borrowed an average of $54,509 and gradu-
ates of private law schools borrowed an average of $83,181, up 17% and 
18.6% from the same figures in 2002. 154 
Recent statistics confirm that the economic downturn has had a major 
effect on employment for recent law school graduates. The Association for 
Legal Career Professionals (NALP) report on the law school graduating 
class of 2009 revealed "an overall employment rate of 88.3% of graduates 
for whom employment status was known."155 This rate "has decreased for 
two years in a row," decreasing 3.6% from the 91.9% for the Class of 
2007. 156 The class of 2009 has the lowest employment rate reported since 
the mid-1990s. 157 
And even these steadily-reducing numbers are regarded as an inflated 
estimate of the likelihood of post-graduation employment. 158 The actual 
employment realities for law school graduates in 2009 were bleaker still. 
Nearly 25% of all employment for law school graduates was reported as 
150. de 1a Merced, supra note 142. 
151. Amir Efrati, Hard Case: Job Market Wanes for U.S. Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
24,2007, at AI. 
152. !d. 
153. !d. 
154. !d. 
155. Press Release, NALP, Class of 2009 Faced New Challenges with Recession: 
Overall Employment Rate Masks Job Market Weakness I (May 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/09SelectedFindingsPressRelease.pdf [hereinafter Class of 
2009]. 
156. !d. 
157. !d. 
158. See David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/20 11/0 1/09/business/09law.html? _r= 1 &pagewanted=all. 
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temporary. 159 This includes reports that 41% of all of the public interest jobs 
were temporary, 30% of all business jobs were temporary, and even 8% of 
the private practice jobs were temporary in nature. 160 Many of these tempo-
rary jobs are positions as contract attorneys, often conducting document 
review for $20 an hour with no benefits.161 
Controversy has surrounded the manner in which law schools report 
their employment data. Law schools blame the ABA's system for collecting 
such data and the competition engendered by the U.S. News rankings sys-
tem. In 2011, at least two law schools were sued by their graduates who 
claim that they were misled by the law schools rosier-than-true employment 
statistics. 162 In August 2011, the ABA passed a resolution encouraging law 
schools to report accurate data and to make it available to prospective stu-
dents.163 
The 88.3% employment rate was also bolstered by the fact that many 
law schools are providing recent graduates with employment to improve 
their employment statistics. Law schools have increasingly provided recent 
graduates with employment through fellowships, grant programs for public 
interest work, and on-campus jobs.164 These programs provided an estimated 
2% of employment for the Class of 2009, over 800 jobs in total. 165 
Law school graduates are also increasingly accepting employment that 
is part-time or non-legal in nature. More than 10% of all employment for 
the law school graduates in 2009 was recorded as part-time, up 6% from the 
previous year. 166 The percentage of law school graduates employed as prac-
ticing attorneys has decreased. 70.8% of law school graduates in 2009 were 
employed in jobs that required a juris doctor, compared with 74.7% of the 
graduates in the previous year. 167 
Along with the decrease in employment numbers for law school grad-
uates, the economic downturn has also changed the nature of law firm hiring 
and recruitment. Summer associate programs, once the breeding grounds for 
associate jobs at law firms, have either been totally cut or shortened at many 
firms. 168 The number of students receiving employment as a summer associ-
159. Class of2009, supra note 155. 
160. /d. 
161. Efrati, supra note 151. 
162. Sarah Randag, Grads Sue New York Law School and Cooley Law, Saying They 
Inflated Job and Salary Stats, Aug. I 0, 20 II, http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/ 
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ate has also sharply decreased. In 2010, a survey reported that large law 
firms reduced their summer associate classes by an average of 44%. 169 Many 
law school graduates who did receive an offer for employment post-
graduation at a law firm saw these offers deferred for a period of time. 170 
These deferrals can last up to a year or longer. 171 Some law firms provide 
stipends for their deferral period and have the opportunity to work in pro-
bono fellowships. 172 Other deferred associates were not as fortunate and had 
to find other employment while waiting for their start dates at firms. 173 Most 
law firms did eventually employ their deferred associates, although some 
firms rescinded their employment offers entirely during the deferral peri-
od.'74 
The general economic woes' effect on law practice resulted in part as 
corporate clients became highly sensitive to the long-standing practice of 
staffing low-level lawyer tasks to beginning law firm associates. Instead, 
corporate clients began using in-house, salaried lawyers to do the work for-
merly done by outside counsel's associates. Clients and law firms began to 
outsource work to lower cost service providers in India and Pakistan, as 
well as contract lawyers present at the firm for task-specific duration. 
Law school employment numbers plummeted, although by some 
measures it was hardly noticeable. Plummet, they did, however, and law 
schools struggled with reform efforts and realignments. At the same time, 
new pressures were being brought to bear on law schools. The law firm 
training of associates, most often done through the assignment of low-level 
corporate work had dried up. In essence, clients stopped paying for begin-
ning associates to be trained on-the-job. Frequent career changes also dis-
couraged law firms from lavish spending on associate training. All eyes 
turned to law schools and their deficient professional training. Both appli-
cants and employers of graduates began to demand better preparation for 
practice. 
The roots of the law schools' troubles date from the late 19th century 
when both legal and medical education underwent reform and scientifica-
tion. For many reasons, the two were reformed in different ways and headed 
in opposite directions. Medical education decided that its mission would be 
169. Nicole Hong, Summer Hiring Survey: 44 Percent Down in 20/0, AM. LAW 
DAILY, July 21, 2010, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/07/summer-
associates.html. 
170. See, e.g., Dana Mattioli, First Task for Law-Firm Hires: Finding an Interim Job 
First, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2009, http://online. wsj.com/article/SB 1254 78012114565787 .html. 
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174. Debra Cassens Weiss, Some Deferred Start Dates May Become Withdrawn Job 
Offers, ABA J., May 12, 2009, http://www.abajoumal.com/weekly/waming_possible_asso 
ciate _pile-up_ ahead_ and_ some_ will_ crash_ and_ burn. 
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to create doctors; legal education decided that its mission would be to create 
law professors. Law departments at major universities resembled philoso-
phy or social science departments, with theory and scholarship the main 
products. Langdell famously said that for law, the "library is the laborato-
ry,"175 and that there was no use in having students engage with courts or 
practitioners, except for the study of appellate court opinions reported in the 
library stacks. Meanwhile, medical education began its move toward prac-
tice education, clinical work and residencies for fledgling doctors. Legal 
education and the legal profession still pay the price for that choice. 
The recent demand that law schools do practice teaching was a 180 
degree change from the 1970s and before. Major law firms preferred to 
teach new associates in their own ways, and were happy enough for law 
schools to refrain from teaching practice habits that the law firms would 
have to re-teach. But by bits, all that had changed until the mid 2000s, when 
the tide had fully turned. 
Like the committee charged with drafting the Canons in 1905176 and 
the Kutak Commission before it, to cure the current professional malaise 
came the 2009 Ethics 20/20 Commission, formed to "perform a thorough 
review of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the U.S. sys-
tem of lawyer regulation in the context of advances in technology and glob-
al legal practice developments." 177 This is a worthy enterprise to be sure. 
But its membership is entirely made up of lawyers. 178 Despite the impetus 
for the Commission's creation ("radical" advances in globalization and new 
technologies), its fundamental principles sound a preservative, inward-
looking note: The principles guiding the Commission's work are to "protect 
the public, preserve core professional values; and maintain a strong, inde-
pendent and self-regulated profession."179 Protection, preservation, and 
maintenance. 180 Among its first decisive acts was to rule out of order any 
suggestion of following the Australian or UK alternative business model 
innovations of the prior decade. 181 
175. Barbara Bintliff, Update on Proposed Changes to ABA Standard 603(d): 
Faculty Status and Tenure for Law Library Directors, available at http://www.aallnet.org/ 
sis/allsis/newsletter/24_3/ABAstandardsupdate.htm (last visited July 12, 2012). 
176. See Transactions of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Bar 
Association, 28 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 3, 132 (1905). 
177. About, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
aba _commission_ on_ ethics_ 20 _ 20/about_ us.html (last visited Apr. 12, 20 12). 
178. /d. 
179. Press Release, ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm Creates Ethics Commission to 
Address Technology and Global Practice Challenges Facing U.S. Lawyers, ABA I (Aug. 4, 
12) available at http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/media/release/news _release.cfm?releas 
eid=730. 
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181. Memorandum from ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Working Group on Al-
ternative Business Structures 2, 16 (Apr. 5, 20 II), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
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Thus far, the Commission's recommendations have been modest and 
could be characterized as a combination of housekeeping, reorganizing, and 
modest updating to include references to more current technological ad-
vances. Even these modest proposals have not yet run the ABA adoption 
gauntlet. Aside from ruling out any consideration of the British and Austral-
ian alternative business models innovations, the Commission's main pro-
posals to date are the following: 
I. Incoming Foreign Lawyers Report, Proposed Amendments to MR 5.5, 
May2, 2011 
Essentially maintains status quo from 2002, but moves the temporary 
practice authorization for foreign lawyers into MR 5.5 rather than have it in 
a separate model rule. 182 This may have the positive effect of having more 
states adopt the temporary foreign authorization, but it made no substantive 
change in ABA policy. 183 The proposal maintained the status quo's narrower 
range for temporary practice by foreign lawyers. 184 
2. In-House Counsel Registration May 2, 2011 Recommendation 
The Report suggests amending the in-house counsel registration rule 
to include foreign lawyers, as has been done in seven states. 185 
3. Outsourcing, May 2, 2011 
No changes to black letter required, but additions to comments to 1.1, 
5.3, 5.5 recommended, none ofwhich change current law. 186 
content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics _ 2020/abs _issues _paper.authcheckdam.pdf ("At its 
February 2011 meeting in Atlanta, the Commission decided that two options for alternative 
business structures-passive equity investment in law firms and the public trading of shares 
in law firms-would not be appropriate to recommend for implementation in the United 
States at this time, though both have been adopted elsewhere since July 2000."). 
182. ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Initial Draft Proposal-Model Rule 5.5 (May 2, 
2011 ), available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files _ tlutter/1304368246 
ethics2020 _ rule5proposals050211.pdf. 
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istration (May 2, 2011 ), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/adminis 
trative/professional_responsibi lity/20 11 0502 _inhousecounsel.authcheckdam.pdf. 
186. ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Initial Draft Proposal-Outsourcing (May 2, 
20 II), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional 
_responsibility/20 110502 _ outsourcing.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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4. Technology and Confidentiality, May 2, 2011 
Many housekeeping edits to Model Rules, most of which restate the 
fairly obvious. Adds MR 1.6(c), which articulates a duty to take reasonable 
care with client information. 187 
5. Pro Hac Vice Recommendations, May 2, 2011 
Added foreign lawyers to the scope of the rule's application, following 
the lead of thirteen states, and added more formalities to the application 
process for pro hac vice admission, making the application process more 
onerous. 188 
6. Use a/Technology Recommendations, June 29, 2011 
Updates the nature of electronic client-getting in MR Comments. 189 
Changes nature of prospective client determination in 1.18 to exclude from 
the category of "prospective client" one who "communicates with a lawyer 
for the primary purpose of disqualifying the lawyer from handling a materi-
ally adverse representation on the same or a substantially related matter ... 
"190 
At most, these changes have caught up to changes that have occurred 
between the last major amendments to the Model Rules in 2002 and the 
present. Largely, the recommendations simply reorganize provisions (such 
as the inclusion of foreign lawyer temporary practice in Model Rule 5.5 
rather than elsewhere). None is especially forward-looking. None modified 
policies in the major areas of change: alternative business models and mul-
tidisciplinary practice. The changes to multijurisdictional practice largely 
catch the ABA up to state-adopted changes. Many appear motivated to en-
hance monitoring of foreign lawyer involvement in the U.S., involvement 
that has become a foregone conclusion and can no longer be prevented as 
some might wish. The most dramatic changes possible, alternative business 
practices reforms, were largely ruled out of order near the beginning of the 
187. ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Initial Draft Proposals-Technology and Confi-
dentiality (May 2, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/adminis 
trative/professional_responsibility/20 I I 0502 _technology .authcheckdam.pdf. 
188. ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Initial Draft Proposal-Pro Hac Vice 
(May 2, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
professional_responsibility/20 II 0502 _prohacvice.authcheckdam.pdf. 
189. ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Initial Draft Proposal-Technology and Adver-
tising (June 29, 2011 ), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/adminis 
trative/professional _responsibility /tech_ client_ development.authcheckdam. pdf. 
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reform process. Once again, change, if any, will have little effect on the 
bar's elite. 
III. HOW REGULATION WOULD BE DIFFERENT IF IT WERE MORE 
INCLUSIVE AND OPEN 
Albert Einstein taught us, "You cannot solve a problem from the same 
consciousness that created it. You must learn to see the world anew." 191 This 
is what the American legal profession tries to do. It clings to the past and 
precedent. It protects, preserves, and maintains. 192 It acts as if preserving the 
status quo will solve all, when in fact it will solve nothing. This backward 
thinking, the same thinking that preceded the crisis, exacerbates the impact 
of the crisis. More than anything else, the legal profession would benefit 
from the thinking patterns of non-lawyers. 
When change comes to the legal profession, it is brought by forces 
outside the bar. "The immigrants" eventually integrated themselves into the 
bar notwithstanding the bar's efforts to diminish and exclude them. The 
changes in demographics have been inevitable, even if resisted at various 
times. The so-called civility crisis of the 1990s came into the profession as 
the world was becoming a more competitive place and road-rage reflected 
one external symptom of an anxious society. Communism came and went 
without being affected by the bar's efforts to stop its professional infiltra-
tion. Economic changes in the 2000s are what they are. The legal market, 
domestic and global, will be what it will be, and the bar's reaction to these 
changes will not stay their effects. 
What change is wrought at the hands of the bar seems designed to 
leave the lives of the bar's elite as-is to the greatest extent possible. The 
legal profession and the society it claims to serve would be better off if reg-
ulation of the legal profession were more open and viewpoint-inclusive. No 
entity, whether motivated by profit, altruism, or a mixture of the two, can 
manage itself without an eye to the future. Businesses and institutions en-
gage in forward-looking strategic planning. Businesses and institutions ex-
amine society's trends to predict future markets and to modify their own 
ways to be well-positioned to succeed in whatever happens to be the busi-
ness or institution's place and goal-set. 
191. Albert Einstein Quotes, THINKEXIST.COM, available at http://thinkexist.cornl 
quotation/you-cannot-solve-a-problem-from-the-same/1 003327 .html (July 12, 20 12). 
192. Memorandum from the ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 181 ("The 
American Bar Association Commission on Ethics 20/20 is examining the impact of globali-
zation and technology on the legal profession. The principles guiding the Commission's 
work are protection of the public; preservation of core professional values; and maintenance 
of a strong, independent and self-regulated profession."). 
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The American legal profession regulates primarily in response to cri-
sis. And when it does regulate, it makes as little change as can be made. 
Much of the change that is made is made in the service of preserving the 
status quo. The 1908 Canons were almost entirely copied from materials 
published in 1854, and the new material prohibiting advertising was meant 
to thwart the effectiveness of the emerging plaintiffs' lawyer class; the 
scramble of change in the late 1970s was meant primarily to quell the furor 
over Watergate; and the Ethics 20/20 changes to date do little more than 
formally announce what has already happened. This is management by 
looking backward and inward. 
Change should be studied and embraced rather than resisted and molli-
fied. For the legal profession to do so, it must change its manner of regula-
tion in a fundamental way. It must welcome the views of non-lawyers not to 
mollify the public because lawyers are not all-knowing. It must view change 
for its benefit rather than its detriment. It must embrace rather than resist 
change. Open meetings must be open in spirit and not merely in form. In its 
current mode of regulation, the legal profession necessarily fails to take 
advantage of trends and movements in society. To be effective, it must 
begin to see outside itself with open eyes rather than suspicious ones. 
To open itself to forward-looking regulation, the legal profession 
needs the help of non-lawyers. Lawyers by nature, training and practice, are 
not aggressively forward-looking organizational planners. Litigators work 
to minimize the harm from or maximize the gain from past events. Their 
work is by its nature backward-looking. Even transactional lawyers, while 
focused on the future plans of their clients, do their work with a goal of 
avoiding controversy for their clients. They seek in their drafting and nego-
tiating work to avoid future conflict for their business clients, while the 
business clients themselves look to the future of their business, anticipating 
new markets and positioning their businesses to take advantage of what they 
believe the future may hold. They do this work by being sensitive to trends 
and changes in culture and society. They do this work by seeing opportunity 
and growth, rather than by seeing and avoiding controversy. I am not dimin-
ishing the importance of the lawyers' work; without the lawyer's sensitivity 
to conflict avoidance, a business client may fall into life's traps and be swal-
lowed up by dangerous future developments. But the lawyer does not seek 
to grow a client's business. A lawyer relies on precedents and on hard 
statements of current legislation and regulation to do her work. Lawyers are 
tied to the past and bound by habit to overvalue the past. Drafting of docu-
ments itself is such an indication: lawyers choose the words that have al-
ways worked, even when those words have lost their meaning in modern 
language. Lawyers "give, devise and bequeath" when "give" would do just 
as well. The reliance on ancient words and coupled synonyms is well-
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documented evidence of lawyers' tendency to be conservative and even 
insecure. 193 Lawyer regulation needs the talents of those who can see the 
road ahead. Such people are more likely to be non-lawyers than lawyers, to 
be more like Steve Jobs than John W. Davis. 
Watson, the IBM computer technology, is an example of non-lawyer 
thinking to solve a problem. Rather than continue with the tried and true 
method of packing information inside a computer's memory endlessly, the 
IBM scientists pursued an entirely new form of computing: create a com-
puter capable of analyzing unstructured data in natural language. "Watson is 
designed according to Unstructured Information Management Architec-
ture-UIMA for short. This software architecture is the standard for devel-
oping programs that analyze unstructured information such as text, audio, 
and images."194 
When the dotcom revolution occurred, major existing businesses were 
faced with a choice: hold tight to traditional ways and try to ride out this 
revolution until it passed, or look forward and blend what they did well with 
new forms and devices. Jack Welch at GE, for example, first wondered how 
the dotcoms might destroy his business, but quickly turned that analysis into 
ways to grow GE's business, asking how the successful dotcoms' innova-
tions could be used to make GE more effective. 195 
Certainly there are exceptions, but the most forward-thinking lawyers 
are not likely to be the leaders of the profession. Richard Susskind, forward-
thinker and lawyer, is an unlikely candidate for Chairman of the Bar Coun-
cil. Certainly, were he an American, he would not likely rise to President of 
the ABA. He simply has not followed the path to that position. With few 
exceptions, the path to organized bar leadership runs through successful 
practice in a large firm, where the values of precedent, history, and tradition 
are strongest, and where the interest in modest if any change is most likely 
to preserve current competitive advantages earned by years of steady, con-
servative management. 
The legal profession needs the consultation of non-lawyers to guide its 
future regulation. Non-lawyers will have none of the legal profession's self-
interest and will more likely have the abilities and temperament conducive 
to forward-looking planning. 
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CONCLUSION 
History demonstrates that lawyers are inept at being their own exclu-
sive regulators. Lawyers tend to look backward to precedent and sideways 
to existing articulations of law. When lawyers do look forward, their prima-
ry task is to predict and guard against risk. It is not in lawyers' nature to be 
forward-looking planners, sensitive to cultural trends. These conservative 
ways of managing have caused the legal profession to manage in reaction to 
crisis. And even then, to seek preservation of the status quo for as long as 
possible, until cultural and economic events impose their own unwanted 
change on the legal profession. 
Change happens. The American legal profession resists change until 
the change dictates its own terms with the profession. As a result, the legal 
profession is a passive member of society. The profession itself fails to play 
a serious role in social change, even when some of its forward-looking 
members are doing so. Its failure of vision seriously limits its flexibility to 
change. It seems to have eyes in the back of its head-but not on its face. 
The unwelcome cure is to enlist non-lawyers in the regulation of the 
legal profession, planners, and evaluators of cultural trends: people who can 
participate in lawyer regulation without the self-interest of the established 
members of the bar; people who have a wider view; people who can see the 
path ahead and not merely the ground already trod. 
